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NOTES
Conclusion
The reversal of Crown Cafeteria and the holding in the Getreu
case seem to better reflect the legislative history and the plain
meaning of the section. Furthermore, these two decisions seem
to obviate the constitutional problems and avoid making the proviso
a nullity. Proviso two still appears to present formidable problems.
But once the present interpretation becomes instilled in labor
relations it should not be lightly overturned. Both management
and labor should know within what bounds they can operate
legally. The present Board's interpretation better effectuates the
policy of the Act than did the prior interpretation and should
be the one to ultimately be declared law, either by clarification by
Congress or the Supreme Court.
THE CONTRACT PROPOSALS TO THE SECOND RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Almost every author who undertakes a discussion of the con-
tracts area of the conflict of laws feels that he must preface his
remarks with some indication of the uncertainty and confusion
surrounding his topic.1 Perhaps the most basic reason for the
confusion can be traced to differences of opinion as to the very
philosophies which form the foundation of our legal system.2  But
a somewhat more mundane explanation may be found in the fact
that theorists attempted to lay down one or two simple and ap-
parently precise rules to govern this wide and complex subject,
while the courts, even when openly espousing these rules, refused
to be controlled by them.3 However, it is only fair to point
out that even before the American courts were confronted with
any "precise rules," 4 one would often find contradictory - or at
Board election. Thus, if the picketing protected by proviso two continues
after such expedited election the picketing will not be an unfair labor practice
under 8(b) (7) (B) and will continue to be protected by that proviso.
1 See, e.g., Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (I),
23 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1909); Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 973 (1959); Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565 (1921).
2See CooK, THE LOGicAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS
3-47 (1942).
3 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLIcT oF LAWS, Introductory Note, at
2 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
4 See RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicT oF LAWS § 332 (1934).
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best confusing 5 - legal terms and concepts used in controversies
involving contracts with "contacts" in several states.
To give a concrete illustration, the New York case of Wilson
v. Lewiston Mill Co.,6 decided in 1896, may be profitably examined.
The plaintiff brought his action to recover damages for an alleged
breach of a contract, but the court first had to decide which state
was to supply the laws to govern the contract. The court indicated
that the intention of the parties was to control; however, "intent"
is a term which is .difficult to define, and, to discover the intent
of two people when they have not expressly indicated it, is even
a more difficult task. Weighing such factors as lex loci solutionis
and lex loci contractus-factors which can be as evasive today as
they were then-the court concluded that the parties "contemplated"
that the laws of Maine were to be applied to their contract. Since
the agreement failed to satisfy the Maine Statute of Frauds, the
plaintiff was denied recovery.
The federalist make-up of the United States provided a
fertile ground for both the growth of conflict of laws principles
and the ambiguities which surrounded the intrinsic 7 validity of
multi-state contracts. For, pulling in almost opposite directions
was the factor of the numerous territories or states promulgating
their own separate laws and the omnipresent desire to maintain
some semblance of uniformity and harmony of law throughout the
country. This striving for uniformity, especially in the area of
contract validity, has most recently found fruition in the contracts
proposals of the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
That the new proposals are so diametrically opposed to the First
Restatement, which was adopted in 1934, is living proof of the
turbulent growth and fluctuation of theory that has gripped our
country for the past several decades.8 The basic sections of the
5 Professor Joseph Beale once commented that "almost every rule ever
suggested for determining the law applicable to the validity of a contract
. . . has . . . been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
as the basis of its decision; that each decision has been made apparently
without realizing its inconsistency with former decisions; and that many
of the decisions are self-contradictory." Beale, What Law Governs the
Validity of a Contract (II), 23 HARv. L. REv. 79, 84-85 (1909). But see
Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51
YAIE L.J. 893 (1942) for a criticism of Beale's analysis of American
conflict cases involving contracts.
6 150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896).
7 Intrinsic or essential validity is distinguished at the outset from mere
formal validity which concerns itself with the form required for contracting.
This note will be more directly concerned with intrinsic validity. See Beale,,
supra note 1, at 3; Lorenzen, supra note 1, at 565.
8 The American system of conflicts law which was so competently
initiated by Joseph Story remained fairly inactive for almost a century.
Following the appearance of the Restatement in 1934, great controversy
arose and interest was stimulated. Yntema. Contract and Conflict of Laws:
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new rules provide, subject to some qualifications, that the parties
can choose the law governing their contract; the rules also describe
the approach that should be taken by the courts to ascertain
the governing law in the absence of an effective choice., In order
to acquire a better perspective of the new Restatement, it would
be profitable, if not necessary, to journey back through the maze
of decisions, theories, and writings before going more deeply into
its specific details.
The starting point of any itinerary through the area of con-
flicts and contracts would logically-though not chronologically 10
have to be Professor Joseph Beale. He was the reporter, and
person most responsible for the first Restatement which appeared
in 1934. However, long before that time, Professor Beale's theories
on conflict rules in general, and contract validity in particular,
were influencing courts and textwriters throughout the land.'
Underlying any particular rules which he laid down to guide
courts in their contract disputes, was his basic theory of vested
rights or territorial sovereignty.' 2  He felt that the mere agree-
ment of two parties to do something could not create any legally
binding obligation to do it; it was only when the law affixed
a legal obligation to the promise that the parties entered into a
contract. Therefore, the question whether a particular contract
was valid could be determined only by the law which applied to
the acts, that is, by the law of the place of contracting. If the
law of that place annexed an obligation to the acts of the parties,
the promisee had a legal right which no other law had power
to take away except as a result of new laws which changed
it,' 3 i. e., the legal right was vested because the sovereign territory,
not the parties, gave efficacy to the acts.' 4
"Autonomy" in Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46, 65(1955).
ORESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, §332, comment b.
10Joseph Story is the acknowledged father of American conflicts law,
but it was Beale, as reporter for the 1934 Restatement, who awakened
America from its conflict of laws lethargy. He is the focal point of
most of the writings on conflicts and contracts that have appeared over the
last thirty years.
11 See, e. g., GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 316-23 (3d ed. 1949) ; Lorenzen,
Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YArE L.J.
565, 656-63 (1921).1 2 CoOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
347-51 (1942).
13 Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (III), 23 HAv.
L. REv. 260, 270-71 (1910).
14As Judge Learned Hand declared: "But an agreement is not a
contract, except as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one
is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation,
and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no more than
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Thus equipped theoretically, Beale, in 1910, gathered cases
from all jurisdictions of the country to find out just how the
courts were handling the problem of the validity of contracts
when the controversy was presented in a conflict of laws setting.
From his readings he formulated three basic rules which seemed
to prevail: (1) the rule which permitted the intention of the
parties to fix the law to govern the contract; (2) that which
held that the place of performance governed the obligation; and,
(3) that which advocated that the place of the making of the
contract should fix the obligation of the parties. 15  With the cases
thus examined, he commenced his famous theoretical and practical
analysis of the three rules.
It is submitted at the outset, that to better understand Beale's
criticism of the first rule, i. e., that intent of the parties be allowed
to govern the obligation, it is necessary to separate the idea of
intent into two categories: express and implied,16 although it does
not appear that Beale himself made such a dissection. His basic
theoretical objection to permitting the parties to expressly select
the governing law was that it would enable the parties to perform
a legislative act.17  To permit the parties to adopt any foreign law
to govern their act was allowing them to free themselves from the
power of the law which would otherwise apply to their acts; and
to give two persons this power was certainly anomalous.' 8
His main practical objection was directed toward the aspect
of implied intent-where, finding no express language, the court
had to search for circumstances to determine what law the parties
wanted to govern their contract. Beale felt that the intention was
found in such cases only after a controversy. The duty of law in
general, and lawyers in particular, was to avoid litigation; and yet,
it was not until a dispute had been submitted to a court that an
attorney could advise his client as to what law was to govern his
contract.19
The second main rule, the law of performance, met the same
basic objections. First, it permitted the parties to substitute some
other law for the law under which they originally purported to
act.20 If the place where the parties acted refused legal validity
to their acts, it was "impossible to see on what principle some other
with whether their acts are torts or crimes." E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).
15 Beale, supra note 13, at 260.
16 Cf. CooK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 390.
17 Beale, supra note 13, at 260. See also, GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 326.
18 Beale, supra note 13, at 261.
19 Beale, supra note 13, at 264.
20 Beale, supra note 13, at 267.
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law may nevertheless give their acts validity." 21 Therefore, any
attempt to make the law of the place of performance govern the
act of contracting was an attempt to give extraterritorial effect
to that law.2 2 Similarly, from the practical standpoint, a lawyer
in a state where the contract was made could not be an expert in
the law of the place where performance was to occur. Thus,
he was in no position to advise his client as to that law while in
the process of drawing up the contract.23
The rule that the place of making was to govern, however,
had none of these objections. There was "no doubt" that this
rule was "theoretically sound." Beale found that even judges who
laid down different rules noted that this was the "natural one."
In essence, the question whether a contract was valid, i. e., whether
the law annexed any obligation to perform to the agreement,
could be determined by no other law than that which applied
to the acts, the law of the place of contracting.24 Then too, this
lex loci contractus presented none of the practical failings of the
other two rules: first, there was no uncertainty in its application;
secondly, the law of the place of making was the simplest to
follow, and even if the place of making was fortuitous, the parties
could consult local counsel.2 5  When the Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws appeared in 1934, it was this "logical and the-
oretically sound" rule which formed the basic section in the contract
area. 26
With this brief sketch of Professor Beale's ideas and works
serving as a springboard as it were, it is possible to move more
deeply into the "confusion" surrounding the validity of multi-state
contracts. Beale's fundamental theory of territorialism was espoused
earlier by the first great American scholar in the conflicts area,
Joseph Story. In his famous treatise we find the principle, later
adopted by Beale, that "the laws of every state, affect and bind
directly ... all contracts made and acts done within it." 27 Story
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. That the laws of one state could not have inherent extra-
territorial effect was the necessary result of the independence of distinct
sovereigns. However, they might indirectly be given effect in other jur-
isdictions by reason of courtesy or comity. See STORY, CONFLICt OF LAws
§278 (3d ed. 1846).
23 Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (III), 23 HARV.
L. REv. 260, 270 (1910).
24 Id. at 270-71. The place in which the final act was done which made
the promise or promises binding was the "place of contracting." 2 BEALE,
CONFLicr OF LAWS § 311.1 (1935).25 Beale, supra note 23, at 271.
2 6 RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §332 (1934). All matters dealing
with capacity, form of the promise, consideration, etc., were determined by
the law of the place of contracting.
27 SToRY, op. cit. supra note 22, § 18; see Beale, supra note 23, at 267.
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felt that every person contracting in a country was understood
to submit himself to its law, and silently assent to its action upon
his contract. The law of the place of the contract acted upon
it, independently of any volition of the parties, by virtue of the
general sovereignty, possessed by every nation, to regulate ali
persons, property and transactions within its own territory.28 How-
ever, it took no more than a rather common type of contract, one
made in one place and .to be performed in another, to bring about
a split in the thinking of these two "territorialists." Thus, while
Beale stayed consistently with his fundamental theory that the
lex loci contractus governed validity, 29 Story indicated that there
was a different general rule when the contract was to be per-
formed in a place other than where it was made. In such a case,
the "presumed intent" of the parties dictated that the contract
as to its validity, as well as to its nature, obligation and inter-
pretation, was to be governed by the law of the place of performance
(lex loci solgtionis).30
The mention of presumed intent here seems illogical to say the
least. For it is said that the law of the place of the contract
acts independently of any volition of the parties; and at the same
time, that "natural justice" 31 demands that the place of performance
must govern because that is the place "presumably intended" by
the parties. Yet it does illustrate the ambiguity which has always
surrounded the basic terms in this area of the law. Story himself
furnishes another example when he says that the term lex loci
contractus "may haVe a double meaning or aspect; and, that it
may indifferently indicate the place, where the contract is actually
made, or that, where it is virtually made according to the intent of
the parties .... ,, 32 The uncertainty of wording, of course, added
to the confusion 33 and made it difficult to categorize men or
jurisdictions as to their views. For example, Story himself could
properly fit into any of the three general rules which Beale set
out: he basically held that the place of performance was to govern
28 STORY, op. cit. Supra note 22, § 261.
29 See Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 655, 661 (1921). However, the law of the place of
performance did govern matters dealing with the sufficiency of performance
or excuse for nonperformance. REsTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 358. Pro-
fessor Cook felt that designating the law of the place of performance as
governing nonperformance was an illogical application of the vested right
theory. For there were no "acts" (nonperformance) upon which the place
of performance could act. Cooic, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 355-57 (1942).
30 STORY, Op. cit. supra note 22, § 280.
31 Ibid.
32 STORY, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 299 (3d ed. 1846).
33 See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (I), 23
HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1909).
[ VOL. 36
NOTES
validity, but this was because of the presumed intent of the parties;
and yet, when performance and making took place in the same
place, then the place of making (lex loci contractus) was to govern.
A more concrete example of the virtual impossibility of "catego-
rizing" is furnished by the famous Supreme Court case of Pritchard
v. Norton,3 4 in 1882. In that case, the defendant Norton had exe-
cuted and delivered to the plaintiff's testator in New York, an indem-
nity bond whereby the testator was to be indemnified against all losses
arising from his liability on an appeal bond which he had signed
as surety. The bond covered litigation in the Louisiana courts,
and it had been signed in Louisiana. The law of New York
subjected the indemnity bond to impeachment for lack of con-
sideration (pre-existing debt), but the law of Louisiana provided
otherwise. Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with the
question of which state's law was to govern the obligations of the
parties. This was to be determined by finding the law which the
parties incorporated into their contract. The Court held that the
parties entered into the indemnity bond with a view to the law
of Louisiana as the place for fulfillment. In later years this one
case was alternately referred to as illustrating no less than four
distinct views: the place of performance theory,35 the rule of
validation theory,36 the proper law theory 3 7 and the intention
theory.35  However, as early as 1910, the tendency throughout
the country was that the intent of the parties should govern.39
The new Restatement has also adopted this rule, so perhaps an
end to the "confusion" is near. In any event, it seems appropriate
that attention now be turned to "intent."
It is stated that the basic premise of the law of contracts is
"that the agreement of the parties, including their intention re-
specting the law to govern the agreement, should be given legal
sanction, except as there are good reasons to the contrary." 40
However, as already stated, any attempt to permit the intent of the
parties to select the governing law was attacked because it sup-
posedly gave them the power to "legislate." 41 Professor Beale
34106 U.S. 124 (1882).
35Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (II), 23 -ARv.
L. REv. 79, 83 (1909).
36Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 999 (1959).37 Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement,
51 YALE L.J. 893, 919 (1942).38 See Lorenzen, supra note 29, at 670-72.
39 See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (II), 23
HARv. L. REv. 194, 207 (1910).40 Yntema, Contract and Conflict of Laws: "Autonomy" in Choice of Law
in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46, 65-66 (1955).
41 See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
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noted that this was permitted on the Continent, where the doctrine
was known as the principle of autonomy of the will, but any
attempt to apply it to a common-law system such as ours was
anomalous. 42  Thus formed the first line of battle, as those who
opposed Beale's views attacked his non-autonomy concept. At the
outset, it was stressed that no one was advocating the idea that
the parties could choose any law. There had to be some sub-
stantial connection between the contract and the place chosenY3
With this in mind, the most famous exponent of expressed intent,
Walter Wheeler Cook, took direct aim on the "legislative" objection
of critics of the intention theory. First, he pointed out some
eleven illustrations, 44 in other areas of the law, where the parties
were permitted to "make law" for themselves by agreeing to alter
the rights they would otherwise have under general rules of law.
Cook's second argument was aimed at showing that a choice of
law by the parties was not an act of legislation at all. When
the parties stipulated that the law of some other state (or country)
was to govern, they agreed that the rules of decision found in that
part of the law of the foreign state in question, which is applicable
to purely domestic transactions, 45 was to be applied to the factual
situation confronting the forum. These rules of decision were
merely incorporated as one term of the agreement, the result being
comparable to the insertion of stipulations which "merely alter
what would otherwise be the legal consequences of the agreement. '46
Even accepting the fact that the parties can legislate or choose
for themselves what law will govern their contract, a more serious
problem is encountered when their intent is not expressly indicated.
This nebulous area of implied intent produces differences among
intention proponents themselves. Some are concerned with the task
42Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (I), 23 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1909).
43 Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties,
32 ILL. L. Rav. 899, 902-03 (1938); see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 332(a), comment f, at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
44 Cook, supra note 43, at 902-06. Among the illustrations cited was
the New York case of Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706
(1931), in which two parties agreed in New York that any differences
arising from their contract, which was to be performed wholly within
the United States, would be settled according to the arbitration law of
England. A dispute arose and recovery was had against the defendant
in England although he ignored all process and did not appear. The Court
of Appeals held that the complaint based on the English arbitration award
stated a cause of action.
45 In other words, the parties were referring to the "local law" of the
foreign state and not to its entire "law" which would include its conflict
of laws principles. This avoids the whole problem of renvoi. Accord,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 43, §332, comment e.4 0 Cook, supra note 43, at 907; see Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
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of finding the "presumed intent" 47 of the parties, while others
just as strongly urge abandoning this fictional search for pre-
sumed intent and advocate the application of certain formulae to
arrive at the law which is to govern the contract.48 However,
this difference of opinion is merely superficial, for beneath the two
views the same elements of contract law are being discussed and
weighed.4 9  The reasoning in both instances is the same-only
the label attached to the conclusion is different.
Accordingly, when Professor Arthur Nussbaum took issue
with Professor Beale's analysis and criticism of the American cases,
he pointed out that in situations where the law governing the
contract had not been expressly agreed upon, the courts were
eager to infer from the surrounding circumstances an "implied"
or "hypothetical" intent.50 This critic felt the more general view
to be:
[T]he law of the country, with which in the expressed or presumed intent
of the parties the contract had its most important connection, shall govern,
taking into account the various territorial contacts of the contract, such
as the place of contract, place of performance, domicile of the parties, situs
of the res, etc.51
This investigation into the territorial contacts was termed the
"objective theory" of intent; 52 and, under it, the courts would be
applying what the English legalists refer to as the "proper law
of the contract," or the law with which the contract is most closely
connected.53
Among those skeptical of the theory of presumed intent was
Cook himself. He viewed it as a "cumbersome and misleading
way of expressing a rule that the 'law' to be applied is that of
the state with which the transaction on a whole has the most
OF THE CoNFLIct OF LAWS 398-99 (1942); Yntema, supra note 40, at
59.
47 See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137-38 (1882). This case
is heavily relied upon by Professor Ehrenzweig, who speaks of presumed
intent with respect to his validation theory. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM,. L. REV. 973, 999 (1959); accord, Jansson
v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1950); Nussbaum, Conflict
Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 896
(1942).
48 See Coox, op. cit. supra note 46, at 416-19; see also WESTLAKE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 212 (5th ed. 1912).
49 Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 47, at 905; see Wilson v. Lewiston Mill
Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 323, 44 N.E. 959, 961-62 (1896). Compare text ac-
companying note 51 infra, with text accompanying note 54 infra.
GO Nussbaum, supra note 47, at 896.
51 Nussbaum, supra note 47, at 896 (emphasis added).
52 Nussbaum, supra note 47, at 897.
53 Ibid.; see CooK, op. cit. supra note 46, at 416.
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substantial or vital connection." 54 He, too, would make a search
for the contacts 55 which a particular contract has with various
states to find where the most substantial connection lies. And,
whether this be a search for the "presumed intent" of the parties
or for the "proper law of the contract" does not change the
result reached.
New York courts have still another name to give to this
search for the governing law when none is expressly referred
to by the parties. They look for the "center of gravity" of a
contract. 56 The center, or place where the most significant contacts
are grouped, furnishes the law to be applied. 57
The case primarily cited in this regard is Auten v. Auten,5 8
which involved a husband and wife, married in England, who
entered into a separation agreement in New York in 1933; The
agreement provided that the husband was to make monthly support
payments for his wife and children, and also that neither party
would start any action relating to their separation. The wife
immediately returned to England and, about a year later, filed
a petition for separation in an English court, but the action never
proceeded to trial. In any event, the years passed and the wife
brought suit in New York for an amount allegedly due under the
agreement. Special Term, concluding that New York law was to
be applied, granted the husband's motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint. 59 The Appellate Division affirmed the
order, but granted leave to amend the complaint so that the wife
could show if any rights had accrued to her prior to the commence-
ment of her English proceeding.60 Both courts, applying New York
law, held that the wife's action in England constituted a rescission
and repudiation of the separation agreement. The Court of Appeals,
54Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention?' of the
Parties, 32 ILL. L. REv. 899, 920 (1938) ; see CooK, op. cit. supra note 46,
at 416.
55 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
56 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1954); In
the Matter of Estate of Bulova, 14 App. Div. 2d 249, 256-57 220 N.Y.S.2d
541, 547-48 (1st Dep't 1961); accord, Zogg v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
276 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960).
57 Judge Fuld, speaking for the court in the Auten case, found the ad-
vantage of the grouping of contacts, or center of gravity, theory to lie in
the fact that "it- gives to the place 'having the most interest in the problem'
paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual
context. . . . Moreover, by stressing the significant contacts, it enables
the court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdictions
involved . . . but also to give effect to the probable intention of the parties.
." Auten v. Auten, supra note 56, at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
58 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
59 Id. at 159, 124 N.E.2d at 101.




however, resorted to a "grouping of contacts" approach and de-
cided thereby that English law, not New York law, was to
govern. Since an issue existed as to whether English courts
treated the commencement of a separation action as a repudiation
of an earlier agreement, the court held that summary judgment
should not have been granted and so the judgments of the lower
courts dismissing the complaint were reversed.6 '
One slight blemish to New York's otherwise complete adop-
tion of this rule results from the fact that the courts occasionally
seem to look upon grouping of contacts as a rationalization of a
result already reached through the traditional conflict rules.
62
Thus, in the case of Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,6 3 decided a year
before the Auten case, the Court of Appeals was confronted with
an attempt to enforce an oral agreement, made in Florida by a
New York domiciliary, wherein a decedent had promised not to
revoke his will. The oral agreement was valid in Florida, but
was a violation of the New York Statute of Frauds. After care-
fully deciding that the contract was not enforceable, whether the
statute was considered substantive or procedural, the court went
on to say that "there is yet another approach to the problem which
tends to dictate the same result . .. the 'center of gravity' theory
of conflicts of laws. . ,, .4
It should be noted that this rationalization is not peculiar to
New York courts. Thus, in the Indiana case of W. H. Barbcr
Co. v. Hughes,(" a decision later cited in the Au ten case, the court
was confronted with an Illinois default judgment which had been
taken pursuant to a cognovit provision in a negotiable instrument.
Such a provision was void in Indiana but valid in Illinois. The
court felt that Illinois law was to determine the validity of the
note because the instrument was executed in Illinois, despite the
fact that the note had been signed and mailed in Indiana. However,
the court went on to say that "as a test of the correctness of our
conclusion that the validity of the note . . . must be determined
by the law of Illinois, we resort to a method (grouping of con-
tacts) used by modern teachers of Conflict of Laws in rationalizing
the results obtained by the courts in decided cases." 66 Using the
"grouping" approach, the court again found that Illinois law
should be applied; and, since under Illinois law the judgment
61 Auten v. Auten, supra note 56.
02See, e.g., Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 113 N.E.2d
424, 431 (1953); In the Matter of Estate of Bulova, supra note 56, at
256, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 547. Note the mention of this rationalization in
Auten v. Auten, supra note 56, at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 102.63 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
64 Id. at 305, 113 N.E.2d at 431.
05223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).66 1d. at 585-86, 63 N.E.2d at 423 (emphasis added).
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taken there was valid, the Indiana court held that it was entitled
to full faith and credit. This case was noted by Professor Fowler
Harper in support of his view that the courts were not really
concerned with the intent of the parties, but actually were dictated
by a policy factor which called for adoption of the law of that
state having the "most intimate connections with the factual context
of the legal problem." 67 However, it seems that the New York
courts are genuinely concerned with intent,68 and, backed by the
new proposals of the Restatement, they may no longer feel the
need to "justify" their decisions.
One final and slightly different aspect of presumed intent
needs mention at this time. There are those who agree that
where no intent is expressed, the courts are searching for a
presumed intent,69 but who feel that the grouping of contacts
is not the proper means of ascertaining it.70 Instead, they take
a more liberal view which Professor Albert Ehrenzweig has called
his "rule of validation."'71 It is based upon the belief that parties
entering into a contract upon equal terms 72 want their agreement
67 Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Re-
reading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155, 1164-66 (1947).
68 See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954);
Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of
Finland, 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N.E. 617, 618 (1935); Wilson v. Lewiston
Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 323, 44 N.E. 959, 961-62 (1896). Doubt may
sometimes arise as to this concern for intent when New York courts make
such statements as "the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract
is determined by the law of the place where the contract is made." Em-
ployers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 333, 205
N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (lst Dep't 1960). See 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 331, 334
(1961), where it is stated that the court was applying the "traditional
conflict of laws tests." However, careful reading of the cases usually
can uncover a preoccupation with the "intent" concept. Thus. the court
in the Employers' Liability case went on to observe that when the contract
was executed "the parties intended the measure of their obligation there-
under to be determined by New York law." Employers' Liability Assur.
Co. v. Aresty, supra at 333, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
69 See Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. REv.
973, 992, 1000-02 (1959).
70 Professor Ehrenzweig has described the center of gravity theory as
nothing "more than an admission of defeat. Like its English model, the
'proper law' theory, it merely states a conclusion and offers little in the
way of guidance. . . ." Id. at 985; see Weintraub, The Contract Proposals
of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L.
REV. 713, 724 (1961).
71 Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, at 974.
72 Professor Ehrenzweig excludes adhesion contracts from his rule of
validation. In such contracts the parties are not really in equal bargaining
positions. Instead an entrepreneur makes use of an already prepared
agreement which the customer often agrees to without any discussion of his




to be binding upon them and the conflict rules should assist them
whenever it can 73 In other words, the courts, with certain
exceptions and restrictions, 4 will apply the law which will make
the contract valid, because presumably when parties enter into
an agreement, they intend to enter into a valid, binding one.78
While welcoming the freedom from the rigidity of the old Re-
statement which the new proposals bring, the proponents of the
validation theory feel that there is still much to be desired.76
That intent plays such a valid role in the make-up of the new
proposals is symbolic of the growth and change that have occurred
in the country's view of conflict of laws during the past several
decades. Now the validity of contracts, except in usury cases, 77
is to be determined by the local law 78 of the state with which
the contract has its most significant relationship-and the state of
most significant relationship is the state chosen by the parties.79
No longer are contracts looked upon as creations of territorial
sovereigns; now the individuals themselves create them. 0 Yet,
in expressly choosing for themselves what law is to govern their
agreement, the parties are kept within reasonable bounds: (1) the
choice must not be obtained unfairly or by mistake;81 (2) there
has to be some substantial relationship with the state chosen; 82
73 Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, at 988.
74 See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, at 1011-24.
75 Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, at 992.
76 See Weintraub, supra note 70, at 730.
77 The new proposals provide that a contract will be protected against a
charge of usury if it is valid under the usury law of any state with which
it has a substantial relationship provided that the rate of interest is not
greatly in excess of the amount permitted by the law of the place which
would have normally supplied the governing law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
Co7Licr OF LAWs § 334d (Tent Draft No. 6, 1960). Compare this with
Ehrenzweig's validation theory which is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 71-75 supra.
78 Note the reference is to the local law and not to the totality of
law which would include the conflict of laws rules. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 77, § 332, comment e.79 RESTATEM T (SEco D), supra note 77, § 332(2).
80 See Yntema, Con tract and Conflict of Laws: "Autonomy" in Choice
of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46, 65 (1955).
81This is the ordinary contractual requirement that there must be a
meeting of the minds. In the case of Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F.
Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court was confronted with a contractual
provision which declared the law of the United States to be the governing
law. However, the court resorted to a grouping of the contacts because(1) the provision appeared in a unilaterally prepared steamship ticket; and(2) the provision was written in English and the plaintiff was a German
national, entirely nonconversant with the English language. Thus, there
vas no indication that the parties had "agreed" upon the governing law.
82 See Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the
Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 899, 919 (1938). But see Ehrenzweig, Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. IZEv. 973, 990 (1959).
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and, (3) application of the chosen law cannot violate the funda-
mental policy of the state whose law would govern if no choice
had been made.s 3 Where the choice of law is ineffective, or
where the parties simply have not selected a governing law, attention
is focused on the "events" of the contract. So when the place of
contracting and the place of performance are in the same state, that
state's local law will govern. 4 It is only when these two events, i. e.,
making and performance, are divided, or when the place of perform-
ance is uncertain, that the courts begin to "group the contacts." s5
The grouping is done simply to find the place of most significant
relationship; wisely, no attempt is made to categorize it as any-
thing else."" The entire second section of the new rules deals with
specific types of contracts in which particular contacts are given
more important roles than others in the determination of the
governing law. 87 But, again, the contacts are considered only
when the parties have failed to make an effective choice of law
of their own.88
83 The "policy" referred to in this section must be of considerable im-
portance before it is deemed "fundamental." But it need not be as strong
as the policy which is required to justify the forum in refusing to entertain
suit upon a foreign cause of action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 77, § 332(a), comment g; cf. Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts:
Cases Versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 920 (1942), where the author
declares it to be "a sound limitation of the intent theory" that the provisions
of the law agreed upon must not conflict with the law or public policy of
the state in which the contract is made.8 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 77, § 332b.
8 5 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), supra note 77, §332b, comment b. Among
the factors or contacts to be considered generally are: place of contracting,
place of performance, domicile of the parties, etc. Significantly, the law
under which the contract will be most effective is also to be considered.
86The cases cited in the reporter's note to the grouping of contacts
section RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 77, §332b, reporter's note
at 35-38, resorted to grouping for various reasons: Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946) (to best accommodate the
equities among the parties to the policies of those states); Pritchard v.
Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882) (to uphold the contract); Jansson v. Swedish
Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950) (to accord with the presumed
intent of the parties); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954)
(to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the
litigation and to give effect to the presumed intent of the parties). How-
ever, the new proposals resort to grouping simply to find the place of most
significant relationship.
87 For example, in a contract for the sale or lease of interests in
immovables, special heed is given the local law of the state where the
immovable is situated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 346e
(1) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).





Bearing in mind the real purpose of any "restatement" of
the law, the remark in the introduction to the new Restatement
that the new rules "are in accord with what most American
cases have done and in accord with what some of them, especially
recent ones, have said," 9 would be reason enough to approve of
them. But they have more to recommend them. Certainty and
predictability are obtained without submission to inflexible, precise
rules which often were ignored by courts to reach just results.
A valid choice by the parties furnishes them with a law which they
know will be applied to any disputes that may arise. Therefore,
they can engage counsel familiar with that law to aid in drawing
up their contract. But the new rules bring certainty to another
area: the governing law not only determines factors concerned
with substantial validity, capacity and formalities, etc., but also
all substantial questions relating to sufficiency of performance,
and excuse for nonperformance as well.90 It will be recalled
that the old Restatement provided that sufficiency of performance
or excuse for nonperformance was to be governed by the law of
the place of performance." Courts frequently were faced with
the difficult task of distinguishing matters of obligation from matters
of performance to determine which law was to govern.Y
2
The Indiana case of Egle'y v. T. B. Bennett & Co.93 is an ideal
example. The parties involved executed a note in Indiana which
was payable in Illinois. The note contained a provision which
authorized any attorney to confess judgment for the maker with-
out service of process or any appearance by the maker. Such a
provision would have no validity in Indiana, but was permitted
by the law of Illinois. A judgment was obtained in Illinois
pursuant to the confession of judgment provision, and the Indiana
court, deciding that such a provision related to performance rather
than formal validity, held that the Illinois judgment was entitled
to full faith and credit. The courts find themselves in a similar
quandary when they have to separate matters of "substance" from
matters of "procedure." The elimination of any necessity for
the courts' having to make such a decision would be most significant,
since quite often substantial rights are affected by the determination.
89 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 87, Introductory Note at 2.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 87, § 346a.
91 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934).
92Indeed the old Restatement itself noted that there was no "logical
line" separating questions of obligation from questions of sufficiency of
performance and excuse for nonperformance. Id. § 358, comment b.)3 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924).
1962 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Some critics find fault with the grouping of contacts pro-
visions . 4  However, assuming arguendo that their attack is valid,
they seem to be concerned with a secondary facet of the rules.
Parties should not be heard to complain of grouping when they
could avoid the problem by expressly designating a governing
law in the first place. The new Restatement heeds the admonition
that sufficient attention be given the social and economic factors
involved in contracts.9 5 The entire second section provides special
treatment for particular contacts when those contacts are integral
to the nature of the contract, e.g., situs of the res in a contract
involving immovables.
A contract "is a promissory agreement between two or more
persons that creates, modifies, or destroys a legal relation." 96 The
proposed Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws would finally
give this power to create, modify and destroy back to the
contracting individuals.
94 See Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUm. L. REv.
973, 984-85 (1959); Weintraub, The Contract Proposals of the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REv. 713, 724
(1961). Weintraub describes grouping as a "contact-counting rather than
a contact-evaluating rule." But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 87,
§ 332b, comment a where it is noted that "a smaller number of more sig-
nificant contacts may outweigh a larger number of less importance."95 See Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
417 (1942).
96 BLAcx, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
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